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Abstract—In this paper, we identify that memory performance plays a
crucial role in the feasibility and effectiveness for performing denial-of-
service attacks on shared cache. Based on this insight, we introduce
new cache DoS attacks, which can be mounted from the user-space
and can cause extreme WCET impacts to cross-core victims—even if
the shared cache is partitioned—by taking advantage of the platform’s
memory address mapping information and HugePage support. We de-
ploy these enhanced attacks on two popular embedded out-of-order
multicore platforms using both synthetic and real-world benchmarks.
The proposed DoS attacks achieve up to 75X WCET increases on the
tested platforms.
Index Terms—Denial-of-Service Attack, Shared Cache, Multicore,
Hugepage, Memory Address Mapping
1 INTRODUCTION
Multicore computing platforms are increasingly used in
safety-critical cyber-physical systems such as self-driving
cars and drones. However, in a multicore platform, a task’s
execution time can vary significantly due to contention in
shared micro-architectural resources when other tasks run
concurrently on the platform [12]. Such timing variation
in multicore can be exploited by attackers. Consider, for
example, a scenario where some cores of a multicore plat-
form are reserved for critical real-time tasks while some
other cores are reserved for user downloaded third party
programs. Even if the platform’s runtime (OS or hypervi-
sor) partitions cores and memory to isolate the potentially
dangerous programs from the critical tasks, as long as they
share the same multicore computing platform, an attacker
controlled downloaded program may still be able to delay
the critical tasks, simply by executing code that exhausts
shared micro-architectural resources, effectively mounting
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.
Modern multicore processors provide a high-degree of
parallelism in accessing memory throughout the memory
hierarchy. At the cache-level, non-blocking caches [21] are
used, which can be accessed even when there are multiple
outstanding cache misses. However, a non-blocking cache
can become inaccessible whenever its internal hardware
buffers are exhausted, at which point the cache cannot
accept any further requests. The cache remains blocked until
the internal buffers become available again [1], [32]. For a
shared last level cache (LLC), cache blocking is especially
problematic because it affects all cores that share the cache,
as all requests to the cache would be blocked, regardless
of their origins. As a result, the cores need to wait for the
cache to unblock, which can take a long time as the cache
may need to access slower main memory, which in turn can
take hundreds of CPU cycles. Therefore, if an attacker can
intentionally induce cache blocking on the shared LLC, they
can cause massive timing impacts to the rest of the cores
even if they cannot directly access them.
Prior work demonstrated the feasibility and severity of
micro-architectural DoS attacks [6], [7], [35] on shared non-
blocking caches, which identified two internal cache hard-
ware structures: (1) miss-status-holding-registers (MSHRs),
which track individual requests generated from cache
misses, and (2) WriteBack Buffers, which temporarily hold
and delay cache write-backs, as potential DoS attack vec-
tors. In these works, an attacker simply accesses a large
array, which quickly generates a large number of concurrent
cache-misses and exhaust those cache internal structures—
inducing cache blocking. They showed that conventional
cache partitioning techniques are ineffective to defend
against such DoS attacks that target internal cache hardware
structures, which may still be shared even if the cache space
is partitioned.
In this paper, we first experimentally show that the
effectiveness of cache DoS attacks is critically dependent
on memory performance. This is because the basis for cache
DoS attacks—inducing cache blocking—is reliant on how
quickly the cache-misses are processed by the lower-level
memory hierarchy. If the memory requests can be processed
at a relatively faster rate, then cache DoS attacks will be less
effective as the cache will not be blocked for as long a time.
On the other hand, if the memory requests are processed
more slowly, the cache DoS attacks would be more effective
as the likelihood of cache blocking would increase.
Based on this insight, we propose memory-aware cache
DoS attacks that can induce more effective cache blocking by
taking advantage of information of the underlying memory
hardware. Like prior cache DoS attacks, our new attacks
also generate continuous cache misses to exhaust cache
internal shared hardware resources. The difference is that
we carefully control those cache misses to target the same
DRAM bank to induce bank conflicts. Note that accesses to
different DRAM banks can occur in parallel, and are thus
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faster. However, accesses to the same bank are serialized,
and thus slower [42]. Since each memory access request
takes longer to finish, the cache would take longer to be-
come unblocked. We further extend these attacks to exploit
HugePage support in Linux to directly control physical
address bits and to avoid TLB misses, while mounting the
attacks from the userspace.
We deploy the proposed memory-aware DoS attacks
on two contemporary embedded multicore platforms using
both synthetic and real-world representative benchmarks.
We find that the proposed DoS attacks are significantly and
consistently more effective at impacting victim task’s WCET
when compared to existing state-of-the-art DoS attacks. For
instance, on one embedded multicore platform we tested,
our proposed attacks result in ∼75X slowdown to a cross-
core victim task, while the state-of-the-art cache DoS attacks
cause ∼21X slowdown.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We show that main memory (DRAM) performance
plays a crucial role in the feasibility and effectiveness
of denial-of-service attacks on shared cache.
• We propose new cache DoS attacks that leverage
platform’s memory address mapping information
and HugePage support to induce prolonged shared
cache blocking by intentionally generating lots of
memory bank conflicts in accessing memory.
• We experimentally demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed DoS attacks on two embedded multi-
core processors using both synthetic and real-word
applications. The results show that our attacks are
significantly more effective than the state-of-the-art.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides necessary background on cache DoS
attacks, memory address mappings and HugePages. Sec-
tion 3 defines the threat model. Section 4 provides motiva-
tion for targeting memory performance. Section 5 discusses
the cache DoS attacks and how they function. Section 6
details how the enhanced DoS attacks work and displays
their efficacy on embedded multicore platforms. Section 7
reviews how our enhanced attacks can be mitigated, or
potentially prevented. We discuss related work in Section 8
and conclude in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide necessary background.
2.1 Non-Blocking Cache
In order to improve cache-level parallelism, modern proces-
sors employ non-blocking caches. Figure 1 shows the internal
organization of a non-blocking L2 cache, and its two internal
hardware structures, Miss-Status-Holding-Registers (MSHRs)
and the WriteBack (WB) buffer.
On a non-blocking cache, when a cache-miss occurs,
an MSHR entry is allocated to record the miss related
information. The MSHR entry is then cleared only when the
desired cache-line is returned from the lower levels of the
memory hierarchy (e.g., LLC, DRAM). Note that while the
outstanding cache miss is being serviced, the cache can still
service memory requests from the CPU cores or higher-level
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Fig. 1: Internal organization of a shared L2 cache. Adopted
from Figure 11.10 in [32].
caches. Multiple outstanding cache-misses can be supported
by a non-blocking cache, although the degree to which it
can happen depends on the size of the cache MSHR, which
determines the cache’s memory-level parallelism (MLP). For
the remainder of this paper, we use the terms local MLP and
global MLP as the number of MSHRs in a private cache and
a shared LLC, respectively.
On the other hand, the WriteBack buffer holds dirty
cache-lines that are evicted from the cache and need to be
written back to the next level in memory. Because reads
from memory, such as the cache refills generated from cache-
line evictions, are generally more important for application
performance, delaying writebacks to memory while reads
are being processed can improve system performance by
reducing bus contention. The writebacks are then sent to
memory when there are no reads being serviced or when the
buffer is full. In this way, a non-blocking cache can support
concurrent access to the cache efficiently most of the time.
Note, however, that when either the MSHRs or WriteBack
buffer become full, the entire cache is blocked and rejects
all subsequent requests until the cache is unblocked when
both structures have free entries available. Unfortunately,
unblocking can take a relatively long time as it depends on
response times from the lower memory levels. In the worst
case, it can take upwards of hundreds of CPU cycles when
accesses to the slower main memory are required, which
are then affected by how congested the DRAM controller is.
Cache blocking is especially problematic in shared caches
as it affects all cores that share that cache. Even if a task’s
memory accesses are all cache hits, the task can still suffer
massive slowdowns if the cache is blocked for a significant
portion of the time.
2.2 Cache DoS Attacks
Recent works have demonstrated that the internal hardware
structures of a non-blocking cache can be exploited to mount
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [6], [35]. Cache DoS attacks
are software attacks that target cache internal hardware
structures of a shared non-blocking cache. Generally, they
are designed to generate as many cache misses and/or
write-backs as fast as possible to overflow the cache internal
hardware structures to induce cache blocking [6], [35]. When
cache blocking occurs on a shared cache in a multicore
processor, it affects all cores and can be devastating. For
example, it has been shown that on a popular embedded
multicore platform, the Raspberry Pi 3, a cache DoS attack
could cause over 300X slowdown to a victim task [6], even
when the victim task is running on a different core with its
own dedicated cache partition and almost all of its memory
accesses are cache hits.
2.3 Memory (DRAM) Address Mapping
A DRAM module is organized into ranks and each rank is
further divided into multiple banks. A bank contains storage
cells, which are organized in rows and columns in a 2D
array-like structure. To access data in the storage cells, the
corresponding row must be activated, which copies the data
of the row into an intermediary buffer, called a row buffer,
which acts as a cache. While in the row buffer, the data can
be read from/written to efficiently. To access a different row,
however, the current row needs to be closed (precharged).
Since both activation and precharge take considerable time,
accesses to different rows in the same bank can decrease
memory performance.
To access specific locations in the memory, the system’s
DRAM controller employs a memory address mapping
scheme that translates a given physical address to the
DRAM specific addresses (module, rank, bank and row, col-
umn). Because DRAM banks can be accessed in parallel, the
address mapping of DRAM banks is particularly important
for performance–if multiple concurrent memory requests
are mapped over different banks, they can be processed effi-
ciently in parallel; if, however, they are mapped to the same
bank, resulting bank conflicts will slowdown the memory
performance.
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Fig. 2: Bits used in the memory address mapping scheme on
the Odroid XU4.
Figure 2 shows the address mapping information of
the Odroid XU4 platform. In this platform, five physical
address bits—7, 13, 14, 15, and 16—are used by the DRAM
controller to map 32 different DRAM banks of the system’s
main memory. Such DRAM bank mapping information can
be obtained experimentally [29], [41] or through platform
documentations. If one can control these physical address
bits in allocating memory blocks, the person can control the
DRAM banks on which the allocated memory blocks will be
located.
2.4 HugePages
In a virtual memory-based system, memory is typically
allocated in 4KB page granularity. However, for large appli-
cations, the 4KB page size can be a performance bottleneck
due to increased address translation overhead (TLB miss,
page fault handling, etc.) To address the shortcomings of
4KB small pages, HugePage support was introduced in Linux
kernel (since v2.6), which gave the option to use larger page
granularities when allocating memory (e.g. 2MB pages).
This reduces the number of pages used by applications and
the CPU’s TLB pressure, as each TLB entry can cover a
larger address range (2MB vs. 4KB). As the 64-bit ARM
architecture has become mainstream, increasingly many
ARM based embedded platforms and operating systems
already support HugePage. Note that support for HugePage
can be beneficial for embedded real-time systems as it can
significantly improve time predictability of the real-time
applications.
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Fig. 3: Virtual address mappings in 4KB and 2MB pages.
Figure 3 shows the virtual address mappings for 4KB
and 2MB page granularity on a 32-bit system. For the 4KB
granularity, 12 bits are used as offset of a page, while 21 bits
are used as offset for a 2MB hugepage.
Note that this means that allocating a single 2MB
hugepage allows us to control a larger portion of the phys-
ical address space without requiring any system privileges.
In the following, we will exploit this ability to control
physical address in creating effective cache DoS attacks.
3 THREAT MODEL
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Fig. 4: Threat model.1
We assume both the victim and attacker are co-located
on the same multicore processor, but they run on their
own dedicated cores, as shown in Figure 4. We assume that
each core of the multicore processor has private caches, but
all cores share a single shared last-level cache (LLC). We
assume that the system’s runtime (OS and hypervisor) pro-
vides core, memory, and LLC space partitioning capabilities.
For partitioning the LLC, we assume page coloring [41] is
implemented in the runtime. We assume that the system
supports HugePages. We assume that the attacker can ob-
tain the system’s DRAM bank mapping information, via
experimental methods [24], [28], [29], [41] or from a manual.
Lastly, we assume that the attacker has no privileges on the
system and can only run non-privileged code on its assigned
attacker cores.
In this setting, the attacker’s primary goal is to delay
execution time of the victim task by mounting denial-of-
service attacks on the shared cache.
4 IMPACT OF MEMORY PERFORMANCE TO CACHE
DOS ATTACKS
In this section, we provide an experimental evidence on the
impact of memory performance to the effectiveness of cache
DoS attacks.
As discussed in Section 2, cache DoS attacks [6], [35]
attempt to exhaust internal hardware buffers of a shared
non-blocking cache to induce cache blocking. The cache
becomes unblocked when the cache internal buffers become
available again, which would require accesses to main mem-
ory. Therefore, we hypothesize that if the access to memory
takes longer, the longer the cache would be blocked. In other
words, our hypothesis is that poor memory performance
would increase the effectiveness of cache DoS attacks.
To test the hypothesis, we perform the same cache
DoS attack experiments as in [6]. That is, we measure the
slowdown of a synthetic victim task on Core 0 while co-
scheduling cache DoS attackers on Cores 1-3 on a Raspberry
Pi 3. Likewise, we structure the tasks such that the victim fits
inside the LLC while all attackers fit inside of memory (i.e.
their working set size is greater than the size of the LLC)
and partition the LLC so that the attackers can’t directly
affect the victim’s performance through cache evictions.
Unlike previous experiments, however, we make use of
the Pi 3’s ability manually control the memory frequency of
its LPDDR2 memory module by modifying the sdram freq
parameter in the config.txt file in the boot partition. By
default, the Pi 3 operates at 900 MHz, but it can be changed
to run anywhere between 100 to 1000 MHz. In our testing,
we configure the memory to run from 1000 MHz down to
100 MHz, in increments of 100 MHz.
Figure 5 shows the results. As we expected, the oper-
ating frequency of the shared memory, and by proxy the
memory’s performance, has significant impact to the effec-
tiveness of cache DoS attacks. As we decrease the frequency,
the slowdown experienced by the victim task significantly
increases. In particular, when we lower the frequency to
only 100 MHz, we observe more than 900X WCET increase of
the victim task. Note that the victim was not supposed to be
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Fig. 5: Effect of memory frequency on performance slow-
down caused due to cache DoS attacks.
affected by slow DRAM performance as its working-set fit
in its own cache partition. The reason for this ”unexpected”
massive WCET increase of the victim is that the slow DRAM
access speed results in longer shared cache blocking when
the attackers generate lots of concurrent cache misses even
though the attackers are on different cores and accessing
their own dedicated cache partitions.
Based on this finding, we hypothesize that DoS attacks
can be more effective if they target main memory, in ad-
dition to the shared LLC, with the goal of decreasing its
performance.
The simplest and most straight-forward way to accom-
plish this would be to directly modify and lower the per-
formance of the main memory. However, in a real-world
setting, attackers would neither have the required privileges
nor physical access to the target machine in order for such
approaches to be viable.
Therefore, in this work, we focus on software approaches
to create more effective DoS attacks by generating memory
access patterns that are slower to process at the hardware
level, and thereby improve the effectiveness of cache DoS
attacks. To achieve this, we make use of a system’s memory
address mapping information and HugePage support as we
detail in the following section.
5 MEMORY-AWARE CACHE DOS ATTACK
In this section, we discuss memory access characteristics
of prior cache DoS attacks and their limitations, followed by
the proposed memory-aware cache DoS attacks.
5.1 Sequential Attack
Figure 6 shows the code snippets of the prior cache
DoS attacks [6], [35], which perform a series of sequential
memory accesses over a large array.
The BwRead attack iteratively reads entries of a large one-
dimensional array at a cache-line granularity (LINE SIZE,
typically 64 bytes). When mem size is larger than the size
of the LLC, it generates lots of cache-misses, which would
access the main memory. On a modern processor, multiple
cache-misses can occur concurrently—with the help of out-
of-order execution and/or hardware prefetchers—which
may stress the MSHRs of the LLC [6], [35].
1 for (i = 0; i<mem size;
2 i += LINE SIZE)
3 {
4 sum += ptr[i];
5 }
(a) Read attack (BwRead)
1 for (i = 0; i<mem size;
2 i += LINE SIZE)
3 {
4 ptr[i] = 0xff;
5 }
(b) Write attack
(BwWrite)
Fig. 6: Sequential memory access attacks. LINE_SIZE = a
cache-line size.
The BwWrite attack operates in a similar manner, but
instead writes a value to each array entry. This will then gen-
erate continuous store operations that can also be configured
to intentionally miss the LLC. Again, multiple write misses
can occur concurrently, which can stress both the MSHRs
and the Writeback Buffer of the cache. This is because each
missed write can generate up to two memory requests: a
read for a cache linefill and a write for a cache writeback [6].
While these attacks are effective at generating a large
number of concurrent cache misses—nnecessary to overflow
the cache internal buffers—the sequential memory access
nature of these attacks means these cache misses can be pro-
cessed efficiently at the memory level. Concretely, success
memory blocks (64B cache-lines) are likely to be allocated on
the same DRAM row (e.g., 8KB), which are then efficiently
processed at the DRAM as costly row switching is not
required. Efficient processing at memory is undesirable from
the perspective of a cache DoS attack because the goal of the
attack is to induce longer cache blocking and fast memory
performance would reduce the duration of cache blocking.
5.2 Parallel Linked-List Attack
To address the shortcomings of the sequential memory
access-based cache DoS attacks, we first introduce parallel
linked-list attacks, which generate concurrent random mem-
ory accesses.
Figure 7 shows the code snippets for the parallel linked-
list attacks: LatencyRead for read and LatencyWrite for write.
In both cases, the attacks traverse a set number of linked
lists, which can be accessed concurrently on a modern out-
of-order core because there is no data dependency between
the entries of different lists. Each linked list is then ran-
domly shuffled over a large memory space to prevent data
prefetching. As such, the number of linked lists determines
the degree of memory-level parallelism (MLP) of the attacks.
Note that the parallel-linked list attacks are based on the
MLP measurement code in [11].
Like the sequential access attacks, the parallel-linked list
attacks are designed to generate concurrent cache-misses,
which would stress cache internal hardware buffers and
induce cache blocking. However, the parallel-linked list
attacks are potentially less efficient in memory as successive
memory requests due to the cache-misses are likely to be
mapped to different DRAM rows, which would require
costly row switching. Note, however, entries of these linked-
lists may still be mapped to different DRAM banks, and thus
can be processed in parallel in DRAM. In such a situation,
despite the overhead of frequent row-switching, the concur-
1 static int* list[MAX MLP];
2 static int next[MAX MLP];
3
4 for (int64 t i = 0; i < iter; i
++) {
5 switch (mlp) {
6 case MAX MLP:
7 .
8 .
9 case 2:
10 next[1] =
11 list[1][next[1]];
12 /* fall−through */
13 case 1:
14 next[0] =
15 list[0][next[0]];
16 }
17 }
(a) Read attack
(LatencyRead)
1 static int* list[MAX MLP];
2 static int next[MAX MLP];
3
4 for (int64 t i = 0; i < iter; i
++) {
5 switch (mlp) {
6 case MAX MLP:
7 .
8 .
9 case 2:
10 list[1][next[1]+1] =
11 0xff;
12 next[1] =
13 list[1][next[1]];
14 /* fall−through */
15 case 1:
16 list[0][next[0]+1] =
17 0xff;
18 next[0] =
19 list[0][next[0]];
20 }
21 }
(b) Write attack
(LatencyWrite)
Fig. 7: Random memory access attacks. MAX MLP = global
MLP of the platform. List entires are randomly shuffled over
a large address space.
rent cache-misses may still be processed efficiently, which is
undesirable from the perspective of cache DoS attacks.
5.3 DRAM Bank-Aware Parallel Linked-List Attack
To overcome the limitations—efficient memory
processing—of the prior cache DoS attacks, we propose a
memory-aware cache DoS attack, which is based on the
parallel-linked list attack code (Section 5.2) but differs in
that the entries of the linked-lists are constructed in such
a way that they are all allocated in the same DRAM bank.
The rational is that when multiple accesses target the same
bank, they will take longer to be serviced at the DRAM
because of increased DRAM bank conflicts and frequent
row switching.
To create such linked lists, the attack code allocates a set
of 2MB huge pages. It then creates a user-defined number of
linked lists and populates them with addresses specifically
chosen to be mapped to the same DRAM bank, utilizing the
system’s DRAM bank address mapping information. (e.g.,
the Odroid XU4 we test uses physical address bits 13-16 as
DRAM bank addresses).
Figure 8 shows the address coloring code snippet that
is used by the attacks for finding addresses that correspond
to the same memory bank. Specifically, it checks the value
of each bit in a given address that corresponds to the set of
bits specified in the mask bitmask, which is the platform’s
physical address bits that are mapped to DRAM banks.
If the returned value is zero, which means that the given
physical address would be mapped to the DRAM bank
zero, we add the address to the linked list as a new entry,
otherwise we discard the address and continue. In these
attacks, since 2MB pages are used for memory allocation,
the attack code can effectively control both the physical and
1 int paddr to color(unsigned long mask, unsigned long
paddr)
2 {
3 int color = 0;
4 int idx = 0;
5 int c;
6 for each set bit(c, &mask, sizeof(unsigned long) * 8) {
7 if ((paddr >> (c)) & 0x1)
8 color |= (1<<idx);
9 idx++;
10 }
11 return color;
12 }
Fig. 8: Physical address coloring used for creating enhanced
cache DoS attacks.
virtual addresses of the list entries. This is because the first
21 bits of the phsyical addresses are identical to the 21-
bit offset in the corresponding virtual address. In our test
platforms, this bit range was sufficient to control DRAM
bank mappings. As a result, all of the linked lists generated,
and their entries, will be allocated to the same memory bank
which will, in turn, generate bank contention.
One notable shortcoming of the proposed memory-
aware attacks is that they do not support in-order processing
cores, such as the Cortex A53 used by the Raspberry Pi 3.
This is because in-order cores cannot concurrently traverse
multiple linked lists. As such, they would not be able to gen-
erate the necessary amount of concurrent memory requests
for cache blocking to occur. As such, we instead target out-
of-order core architectures that are inherently capable of
generating multiple memory requests so that our attacks can
still successfully and effectively generate cache blocking.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of the pro-
posed memory-aware cache DoS attacks on two embedded
multicore-based platforms using both synthetic and real-
word applications.
6.1 Embedded Multicore Platforms
Platform Odroid XU4 Raspberry Pi 4 Model B
SoC Exynos5422 BCM2711
CPU
4x Cortex-A7 4x Cortex-A15 4x Cortex-A72
in-order out-of-order out-of-order
1.4GHz 2.0GHz 1.5GHz
Private Cache 32/32KB 32/32KB 32K/32K
Shared Cache 512KB (16-way) 2MB (16-way) 512KB (16-way)
Local MLP 1 6 6
Global MLP 4 11 19
Memory 2GB LPDDR3 4GB LPDDR4
(Peak BW) (14.9GB/s) (25.6 GB/s)
DRAM bank bits 13, 14, 15, 16 8, 11, 12, 13, 14
(Bitmask) (0x1E000) (0x7900)
TABLE 1: Compared embedded multicore platforms.
We deploy our DoS attacks on two embedded multicore
platforms: an Odroid XU4 and a Raspberry Pi 4 Model B.
The Odroid XU4 employs a big.LITTLE processor config-
uration comprised of a smaller 4xCortex-A7 [4] in-order
core cluster and a larger 4xCortex-A15 [3] out-of-order core
cluster. Note that we do not use the Cortex-A7 cluster on
the Odroid XU4 as we are primarily focused on out-of-
order architecture designs. The second platform we test, the
Raspberry Pi 4, only equips a single cluster of 4x Cortex-A72
out-of-order cores. The Cortex-A15 and Cortex-A72 each
have a local MLP of 6, with the A15 having a global MLP
of 11 [3], [35] and the A72 having global MLP of 19 [5].
Note that we verified the global MLP of the A72 cluster
by employing the same MLP micro-benchmark described
in Appendix A of [35]. For both multicore systems, we use
platform specific DRAM bank bitmasks in the creation of
the enhanced attacks linked lists. We reverse engineer the
address mapping schemes for both platforms by using the
same technique as in [29], [41]. Table 1 shows the characteris-
tics of the tested platforms. The XU4 runs Ubuntu 18.04 and
Linux kernel 4.14, while the Pi 4 runs Raspbian Buster and
Linux kernel 4.19. Note that both platforms run the latest
version of Linux officially supported on them, respectively.
6.2 Synthetic Workloads
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
BwRead
LatencyRead
BankRead
BwWrite
LatencyWrite
BankWrite
30.38 56.15
Sl
ow
do
w
n
solo
+1 attack
+2 attack
+3 attack
(a) Odroid XU4(A15)
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
BwRead
LatencyRead
BankRead
BwWrite
LatencyWrite
BankWrite
Sl
ow
do
w
n
solo
+1 attack
+2 attack
+3 attack
(b) Raspberry Pi 4 (A72)
Fig. 9: Impacts of cache DoS attacks to the BwRead victim on
two multicore platforms. The victim (BwRead) runs on Core
0 while the attackers (X-axis) run on Core 1-3.
The experimental setup is as follows: we run each victim
task alone on a single core, Core 0, to measure its solo
response time. We then run the victim task alongside up
to three instances of each attacker, scheduled on Cores 1-3,
and measure the response times to determine the slowdown
each attack caused on the victim relative to the solo case.
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
BwRead
LatencyRead
BankRead
BwWrite
LatencyWrite
BankWrite
39.54 42.70 74.99
Sl
ow
do
w
n
solo
+1 attack
+2 attack
+3 attack
(a) Odroid XU4(A15)
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
BwRead
LatencyRead
BankRead
BwWrite
LatencyWrite
BankWrite
33.51
Sl
ow
do
w
n
solo
+1 attack
+2 attack
+3 attack
(b) Raspberry Pi 4 (A72)
Fig. 10: Impacts of cache DoS attacks to the LatencyRead vic-
tim on two multicore platforms. The victim (LatencyRead)
runs on Core 0 while the attackers (X-axis) run on Core 1-3.
For the victim tasks, we use two of the cache DoS
attackers—namely BwRead (Section 5.1) and LatencyRead
(Section 5.2)—as victim tasks. We selected them as vic-
tim tasks as they differ in their access patterns: BwRead
performs sequential accesses while LatencyRead performs
random accesses. Note that we configure both victims to fit
inside the LLC of each tested platform.
For the attackers, we employ all three cache DoS attack
types discussed in Section 5, with each one capable of
being read intensive or write intensive, for a total of six
attacking tasks. For all attacking processes, we configure
their working set sizes to fit inside of DRAM such that they
can effectively generate shared cache misses.
Figure 9 shows the impacts of cache DoS attacks to the
BwRead victim. On Odroid-XU4’s Cortex-A15 cluster, both
BankRead and BankWrite attackers, which are DRAM Bank-
aware, caused the most slowdowns to the victim task’s per-
formance. The worst case slowdown of the BwRead victim
was ∼30X when paired with three BankRead attackers, and
∼56X with three BankWrite attackers. On the Raspberry Pi
4, however, BwRead victim suffers little to no interference
from any of the DoS attackers. We believe this difference
is due to a combination of the following two factors. First,
the Pi 4 equips a more powerful LPDDR4 memory module
when compared to the XU4’s DDR3 module. As a result, this
allows for faster memory accesses on the Pi 4 which ulti-
mately reduces the amount of time the LLC spends blocked,
as we explained in Section 4. Second, the Pi 4’s Cortex-
A72 employs stride-based L1D hardware prefetchers that
are triggered after accesses to consecutive cache lines [5].
As such, the sequential access pattern of the BwRead victim
would make the L1 prefetcher very effective on the Pi 4.
On the other hand, the Cortex-A15 of Odroid-XU4 does not
equip L1D prefetcher according to [3]. Hence, XU4’s victim
is more vulnerable to the LLC blocking than that of Pi 4.
Figure 10 shows the impacts of cache DoS attacks to
the LatencyRead victim. On Odroid-XU4, BankRead and
BankWrite attackers achieves up to ∼40X and ∼75X slow-
downs, respectively, to the LatencyRead victim task’s per-
formance. Interestingly, unlike the BwRead victim in Fig-
ure 9, LatencyRead victim is also significantly affected by
BwRead and BwWrite attackers as it suffers up to ∼33.5X
slowdown. This is likely because the random access mem-
ory pattern of the LatencyRead victim reduces the effective-
ness of Cortex-A72 cores’ L1D prefetcher.
6.3 Impact of Cache Partitioning
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of a stan-
dard cache isolation mechanism in protecting victim perfor-
mance from the BankRead and BankWrite attacks. Specif-
ically, we employ a kernel level memory allocator called
PALLOC [41] which uses a page coloring technique to
control the cache space a process can use for allocating
data. Using PALLOC, we partition the L2 cache on the
XU4 such that each core is given its own private quarter
of the cache space. We then run the same LatencyRead
vs. BankRead/BankWrite attacks on the XU4’s A15 cluster
as that is where we saw the most interference from our
enhanced DoS attacks.
Figure 11a shows the results. We find that partitioning
the cache is ineffective in protecting the performance of the
LatencyRead victim as the slowdown observed is practically
the same regardless of whether the LLC is partitioned. This
is consistent with previous findings [6], [35] as partitioning
the cache space does not partition the internal hardware
structures, namely the MSHRs and the Writeback Buffer. As
such, the DoS attacks can still induce massive shared cache
blocking despite cache (space) partitioning.
6.4 Impact to Real-World Applications
We also test the effectiveness of our enhanced DoS attacks
on real-world applications to test their feasibility.
6.4.1 End-to-End Deep Learning Based Autonomous Vehi-
cle Control
We begin our testing by running DoS attacks against a DNN
used by NVIDIA’s DAVE-2 system [8] and the DeepPicar
autonomous car platform [7]. We employ the same basic
experimental setup where a single victim instance is run
alone on Core 0 and alongside 1-3 cache DoS attackers on
Cores 1-3. For the DNN, we use 1000 video frames as input
and calculate the average frame inferencing time.
Figure 12 shows the results. Note that when the DNN
control task runs on either the XU4’s A15 cluster or the Pi
4, the DNN experienced noticeably more slowdown when
run alongside BankRead and BankWrite attackers. This is
especially true for the BankWrite attackers as they were able
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Fig. 11: Effect of cache partitioning on BankRead and
BankWrite impacts to a LatencyRead victim.
to cause∼5X slowdown on both platforms. Compared to the
synthetic victim tests, though, the magnitude of slowdown
experienced by the DNN is much less. This is because the
DNN task accessed the shared LLC less frequently than the
synthetic ones and thus is less impacted by the cache DoS
attacks.
6.4.2 Real-World Benchmark Suites
We also deploy the BankWrite DoS attacks against real-
world benchmarks from the SPEC2017 [2] and SD-VBS [37]
benchmark suites. In total, we use 32 benchmarks as victim
tasks, 23 from the SPECrate 2017 Integer suite and all 9 from
the SD-VBS suite. For all benchmarks, we employ the same
experimental methodology used in Section 6.2. That is, we
measure the victim’s execution time first alone in isolation
and then together with three instances of each of the three
different DoS attackers. For the attackers, we choose to only
employ only the write versions (BwWrite, LatencyWrite,
BankWrite) as they have been shown to generate more
contention than their respective read versions.
Figure 13a shows the results for the XU4 while Fig-
ure 13b shows the results for the Pi 4. Like the DNN, the
SPEC2017 and SD-VBS benchmarks suffer the most from
the memory-aware cache DoS attack. On the XU4, our
best memory-aware attack, BankWrite, achieves a geomet-
ric mean of 7.5X slowdown (up to 23.8X for cactuBSSN),
which is 90% and 123% better than the prior BwWrite and
LatencyWrite attacks, respectively. On the Pi 4, BankWrite
achieves a geometric mean of 6X slowdown (up to 21.4X for
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Fig. 12: Impacts of cache DoS attacks to the DeepPicar DNN
control task on two multicore platforms. The DNN victim
runs on Core 0 while the attackers (X-axis) run on Core 1-3.
bwaves), which is 43% and 49% better than the BwWrite and
LatencyWrite attacks, respectively.
In summary, we find that proposed memory-aware at-
tacks are substantially more effective than prior cache DoS
attacks in increasing the execution times of real-world ap-
plications.
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss different system design
choices and mechanisms that can be used to effectively
prevent the cache DoS attacks we introduce in this paper.
In particular, we focus on the two main aspects of our
attacks that are necessary for successful DoS attacks and
a system design choice that can effectively eliminate MSHR
contention.
The key underlying assumption made by our attacks is
that the memory address mapping scheme used by a system
is already known or can be determined by the attacker. As
such, our memory-aware DoS attacks can be prevented by
making it difficult to determine such mapping information.
For example, employing a XOR addressing scheme [43], and
its variations used in recent Intel processors, can defeat our
current memory-aware cache DoS attacks.
Another assumption for our attacks is that HugePages
are enabled and can be allocated by the attacker. Without
HugePage support, only a 4KB address space can be con-
trolled by the non-privileged attacker, which is insufficient
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Fig. 13: Impacts of cache write DoS attacks on SPEC2017 and
SD-VBS benchmarks. All benchmark victims run on Core 0
while the cache DoS attackers (X-axis) run on Core 1-3.
to be able to control DRAM bank allocation on most plat-
forms. Therefore, disabling HugePages or making it acces-
sible to only privileged users can also defeat our memory-
aware DoS attacks, though it could also lead to increased
timing variability due to increased TLB pressure and page
fault handling overhead.
The partitioning of cache internal structures (MSHRs,
WBBuffer) as proposed in [9], [35] can fundamentally pre-
vent our DoS attacks, although it requires hardware mod-
ifications and is not available on COTS processors. Lastly,
memory bandwidth throttling can help protect against our
cache DoS attacks, as was shown by the OS-based solution
presented in [6].
8 RELATED WORK
Most prior work in the real-time community to improve
isolation has been focused on the isolation of shared cache
space. Various cache partitioning mechanisms and poli-
cies are studied [10], [15]–[18], [22], [25], [34], [38], [39].
However, as shown in prior works [6], [35] and in our
experiments in Section 6.3, such partitioning techniques are
ineffective at mitigating DoS attacks aimed at the cache’s
internal hardware structures since they remained shared
between all cores, as was shown to be the case in [6], [35].
Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks have been studied for
several different types of shared resources in multicore
systems. Moscibroda et al. demonstrated DoS attacks on
memory (DRAM) controllers. In particular, they found that
the widely used FR-FCFS [30] scheduling algorithm, which
prioritizes row hits, is susceptible to DoS attacks. To ad-
dress this, they proposed the use of “fair” scheduling al-
gorithms, which has since been adopted in many memory
controllers [19], [26], [27], [33]. Keramidas et al. studied DoS
attacks on cache space and proposed a cache replacement
policy that allocates less space to such attackers (or cache
hungry threads) [14]. Woo et al. investigated DoS attacks on
cache bus (between L1 and L2) bandwidth, main memory
bus (front-side bus) bandwidth, and shared cache space,
on a simulated multicore platform [40]. In contrast, recent
prior work focused on internal hardware buffers of shared
non-blocking caches and demonstrated the effectiveness
and severity of cache DoS attacks [6], [7], [35]. The work
presented here significantly improves the effectiveness of
the prior cache DoS attacks by taking advantage of memory
address mapping information and HugePage support to
create more effective attacks.
Recently, micro-architectural timing channel attacks
have gained notoriety, as seen by the Meltdown, Spectre,
Foreshadow, and ZombieLoad attacks [20], [23], [31], [36].
These attacks generally work by measuring the timing dif-
ferences in accessing certain micro-architectural resources
(e.g., cache), whose states are altered in such a way to
leak secrets. For example, Jiang et al. [13] showed that
knowledge of L1 cache bank layouts could be leveraged for
a timing channel attack that intentionally generated L1 bank
contention. By doing so, they were able to retrieve a full 128-
bit AES encryption key in less than three minutes. While
these attacks target micro-architectural resources, they are
different from DoS attacks in that their goal is to leak secrets
rather than impacting real-time performance.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced memory-aware cache DoS
attacks that leverage a system’s memory address mapping
information and HugePage support to induce prolonged
cache blocking by intentionally creating DRAM bank con-
gestion. From extensive experiments on two popular em-
bedded multicore platforms, we show that our new DoS
attacks can generate significantly higher timing impacts
to cross-core victim tasks compared to prior cache DoS
attacks. For future work, we plan to launch our attacks
on platforms that employ more sophisticated XOR address
mapping schemes and evaluate their feasibility on server
and cloud-based platforms.
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